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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information and communication technology (ICT) has brought to us more effi-
cient ways of storing, retrieving, transmitting and processing data. As a result
of which we are witnessing various innovative application of ICT in both the
public and private sector to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and customer or
citizen convenience and satisfaction. Consequently, ICT has contributed to the
rise in the use of ”Code” in both public and private sectors with the anticipated
objective of an improved service delivery and exercise of authority among oth-
ers.
The European commission (EC) is one of the institutions which are con-
cerned about how ICT can facilitate policy delivery in various areas of public
administration. In the 80s the EC initiated the policy to ensure improved ac-
cess to public information. The policy was known as the ’Guidelines for Im-
proving the Synergy between the Public and Private Sectors in the Information
Market (GISPPSIM) 1. The Directorate General (DG) XIII was in charge of the
implementation of this policy.
The public sector is the controller of citizen and government information
which is valuable to the operations of businesses and enterprises. One of the
core policy objective of GISPPSIM was to allow access to the information con-
trolled by the public sector. The GISPPSIM was an attempt to stimulate the
new information market in order to improve access to government held infor-
mation . In this regard, quality information was made available to the private
sector at a marginal cost to aid the day to day business operations. The public
sector was regarded as information service provider, whose duty was among
other things to sell information to the private sector.
1 European Commission. Guidelines for improving the synergy between the public and
private sectors in the information market. http://www.viw.or.at/intern/riand4.pdf, April
2006
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The Directory General XIII has taken up new roles since its creation in the
80s. In 1986 it was revamped to take charge of the Telecommunication and In-
formation Society Policy. Before 1993 the DG XIII in collaboration with other
DG tackled the process of liberalization of the telecommunication sector defin-
ing an action plan for the development of the information society. In 2000
the DG XIII was organized and renamed ( as Information Society & Media
Directorate-General ) once more to take up a new role under the eEurope Ini-
tiative 2.
One of the mandates of Information Society & Media Directorate-General
is to implement the e-government policy. The policy is named i2010 action
plan. This plan is expected to usher the European Union (EU) into a new era
of more transparent public administration and service delivery to the citizens.
It will once more rely on ICT to ensure the fulfillment of the policy objectives.
Though both the former and the latter policies aim at transparent public ad-
ministration, the e-government has a broader scope than the former DG XIII
of the EC’s GISPPSIM policy. The e-government initiative extends beyond the
private sector or enterprise and just access to public information. It involves
an all citizens’ inclusive policy, effective and efficient services delivery, high
impact services and interactive communication between government and citi-
zenry.
While these kinds of policies that rely on ICT serve noble purposes, one of
the setbacks is the effect of automation on our values system or rule of law in
legislation. Certain aspect of policies which borders on law needs to be auto-
mated in order to derive the full benefit of the policy. This automation is done
using computer programs. Policy automation allows rules of law in legisla-
tion, contracts, etc. to be implemented or expressed in computer programs 3.
Sometimes technical requirements and system design choices put limits on the
law. These kinds of computer programs have been labeled differently by two
of the famous authorities in the field of IT law, namely Lessig and Reidenberg.
Reidenberg calls these kinds of computer programs that implement policies
or laws as lex informatica. Reidenberg argues that in a network environment
or cyberspace, law and government regulations are not the only source of law.
System design choices and the capabilities of the technologies in cyberspace
impose rules on the people who use the network 4. Lessig call these users
2Jean Monnet Professor Antonio Alabau. Understanding the e-government policy of the
European union, pages 8-9. http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=18443, July 2003.
3Dag Wiese Stratum. Access to government held information, challenges and possibilities.
http://www.viw.or.at/intern/riand4.pdf, February 1998.
4Joel R Reidenberg. Lex informatica: The formulation of information policy rules through
technology. Texas Law Review, 76(3), February 1998.
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cyberspace citizens 5.
1.1 European Union (EU) Action Plan
In an attempt to improve efficiency, to ensure more transparent public admin-
istration, and also to enjoy the full benefits of e-government, the EC in April
2006, came out with e-government action plan, an integral part of the i2010
initiative. This plan is expected to be fully implemented by the end of 2010.
The plan is named i2010. The basic aim of this plan is to increase the number
of cyberspace citizens by ensuring that every European citizens including the
aged and disabled are motivated to use ICT to facilitate their day to day activ-
ities. This plan seeks to impact on the number of people who use the Internet
and ICT technology. This will eventually give rise to the potential privacy in-
cidents in cyberspace.
1.2 Research Problem
The EC i2010 Action Plan on e-government aims at ensuring that ICT and its
applications will define the course of public administration in the years ahead.
The plan is supposed to turn a new page in the history of public administra-
tion where more and more citizens will interact in cyberspace rather than in
real space. The goal of this thesis is to investigate the potential impact of the
EC Action Plan on individual privacy as more and more e-government sys-
tems are being implemented in fulfillment of this action plan. In this regard
following questions will be examined
• Does the EU data protection directive (DPD) apply to e-government?
• Does the EU data protection directive prohibit intelligent use of data?
• What is the impact of EU data protection directive on interoperability?
• What is the impact of EU data protection directive on data security?
• Does the i2010 action plan show strong privacy concerns?
• Is there a need for privacy impact assessment as a benchmark indicator
of the i2010 action plan?
5Lawrence Lessig. Code 2.0, volume 2. Basic Books, 2 edition, December 2006.
3
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.3 Rationale and Relevance of the Study
This thesis will examine the above question in order to understand how they
impact on e-government. Generally, an electronic government system could
contribute to the erosion of privacy and give the government undue power if
it does not show strong privacy concerns in its design and implementation.
There is the need for proactive measures in protecting individual privacy be-
cause it can be difficult to regain once it is gone. Privacy could serve as a
powerful tool to check arbitrariness and disproportionate use of power in a
democratic society. Personal data is a valuable asset and it protection will play
a significant role in ensuring the balance of power between citizen and State 6.
A large scale usage, aggregation, exchange and data mining of personal data
in e-government may have a negative effect on the balance of power between
the citizen and the State and could result in privacy erosion.
Further, e-government system rely on trust and trust is imbued in security
and privacy. Citizens could patronize e-government system if it provides them
with the necessary convenience, security and privacy 7. Privacy impact as-
sessment could be relied upon to access the level of privacy in a e-government
system. The i2010 action plan has major performance indicators which rate
member states according to their progress and how close they are in achieving
the objectives of the plan. It is not clear why privacy assessment is not part of
the 52 performance or benchmark indicators.
Furthermore, the DPD set the lowest standard for data protection in the EU.
It also tries to harmonize the data protection laws across the EU. It is therefore
important to understand how these laws affect e-government. Does the di-
rective serve as a barrier to e-government or does it supports the growth of
e-government.
1.4 Structure
The next chapter examines the EC action plan in detail. We will consider the
objective of the plan and the prominence of privacy and data protection in the
plan.
The third chapter provides an overview of privacy and data protection and
how e-government affects privacy. The objective of this is to help the reader to
6Xavier Huysmans. Privacy friendly identity management in e-government. SpringerLink,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/a34758h15j085420/fulltext.pdf?page=1
7Asne Flyen Christine Hafskjold. Security and Privacy, page 2 www.teknologiradet.no,
2007.
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properly appreciate the subject matter. It will also offer the reader the legal sig-
nificance of privacy and why it is necessary to protect it from erosion through
technological advancement. Various privacy cases will be discussed to throw
more light on the subject matter.
The fourth chapter will mainly focus on discussing the research questions
above. This will critically analyze the i2010 action plan on e-government with
the aim of answering the research questions. It will focus on the impact of
DPD on e-government, how other indicators such as privacy impact assess-
ment may affect e-government patronage and the need to include them in the
e-government performance metric or benchmark indicators.
The final chapter will offering opinions on the impact of i2010 on the pri-
vacy and whether or not the plan has adequate regard for privacy and data
protection.
5
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Chapter 2
i2010 Action Plan
2.1 Overview
E-government stands for electronic government or government online. It is
the fusion of two words, electronic and government. According Donald F.
Kettl, Government ”is an institutional superstructure that society uses to translate
politics into policies and legislation” 8. Government is responsible for decisions
making, development of substantive and procedures rules (bureaucracy), as-
signing roles (hiring and recruitment), and implementation of policies and per-
formance evaluations of policies such as e-government and educational poli-
cies. In recent times, government is increasingly relying on ICT to fulfill its
obligation to its citizens. E-government is an electronic tool that aids the gov-
ernment to fulfill it obligations to its citizens. It allows government to conduct
its business on line or in cyberspace instead of the real space. E-government
encompasses electronic workflow, electronic service delivery, electronic voting
and electronic productivity .
In the 80s access to government information was key in ensuring transpar-
ent government. The contemporary times have witness new forms of demands
for good governance and this includes more open, efficient, accountable and
citizen centric government.
The main focus of e-government is to ensure efficiency in public adminis-
tration by relying on ICT technology. E-government encourages greater pub-
lic participation in government decision making and promotes a more open,
more informed citizenry, cost effective, responsive and accountable govern-
ment. With e-government the public can transact business with the govern-
8Thomas B Riley. e-government vs. e-governance, examining the differences in a changing
public sector climate, page 6. May 2003
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ment, get their Social Security checks, pay taxes, download documents (medi-
cal information), apply for governments’ jobs, put in bids on contracts, fill out
forms and applications and interact with their elected officials all in cyberspace
or in an online environment.
What has become i2010 policy for e-government has a rather long history.
It has evolved from the activities of the old DG XIII whose mandate was to
promote information market in the early 80s. In 1986 the old DG XIII which
was in charge of public administration was refocused and given additional
responsibility of everything related to Telecommunications and Information
Society 9. It was renamed DG Information society. The DG Information Society
together with DG Competition led the liberalization of the telecommunication
market. Additionally, it put forward the action plan for the development of
information society, (eEurope 2002) in 2000 and later on eEurope 2005. It is in
this plan that the principles of e-government or online public administration
were born. The focus on building ICT infrastructure and the liberalization of
telecommunication market have to give way to a new realization of public
administration and service delivery that depend on a new broad band ICT
infrastructure.
The i2010 action plan is the EU’s policy guideline on e-government. This
guideline emerged from the eEurope initiatives and is the follow up of eEu-
rope 2005. The guideline focuses on five main areas. They are inclusive e-
government, efficiency and effectiveness, high impact key services, key en-
abler and citizen participation 10 11.
2.1.1 Inclusive e-government
The EU is saddled with challenges such as ageing, access to Internet, lack of
ICT skills etc. Inclusive e-government is to ensure that these obstacles are re-
moved.
The inclusive policy is to ensure that no citizen is left behind. It targets
the vulnerable and disadvantaged people in the EU who by virtue of their
9Understanding The e-government Policy of The European Union, pages 8-9,Antonio
Alabau, Jean Monnet Professor, July, 2003, Working Document Reference, PTSI/24,
http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=18443
10Commission of the European Communities. i2010 E-government Ac-
tion Plan. Accelerating E-government in Europe for Benefit of all.
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/newsroom/cf/itemshortdetail.cfm?item id April
2006.
11European Commission Directorate General Information Soci-
ety and Media. ICT for Government and Public Services.
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/activities/egovernment/index en.htm.
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state may be deprived from accessing e-government system. There is a need
to bridge the digital divide between people who have access to ICT and those
who do not. It was found that about 30% of Europeans do not use any e-
government services. This 30% gap could be caused by the lack of ICT skill,
readily available ICT infrastructure or affordable ICT services. Affordability
is likely to impact unemployed citizens who may not be in the position to
afford expensive ICT services or access. Ironically, such people who are ex-
cluded from e-government are those who are most likely to benefit from the
e-government system . Furthermore, the policy also ensures that citizens are
not discriminated against because of their disability or age. Multiple channels
of access should be used to reach such citizens 12 13.
2.1.2 Efficiency and Effectiveness
’Efficiency and effectiveness’ is the second objective of the action plan. The
main goal is to ensure efficient and effective service delivery. Efficiency may
be the optimal mix of cost and benefits, while effectiveness is to obtain a certain
level of service at the lowest cost. How long it take to deliver a service and how
well we are able to satisfy our users may determine how this goal is achieved.
It has ensured inter alia reduction in long queues and unnecessary delays in
public administration, eliminated repetitive form filling and time consuming
bureaucracy. The e-government system is expected to support effective deci-
sion making.
The direct benefits of this policy will be to improve the economy and gov-
ernance since it will substantially reduce administrative cost, enhance trans-
parency and accountability 12,13.
2.1.3 High Impact Key Services
E-government services are usually provided for the citizens of a particular
member state even though certain services can be available for all member
states. For instance since the EU supports effective competition and the single
market, bidding for contracts can be available for all member states to com-
12Commission of the European Communities. i2010 e-government ac-
tion plan, accelerating e-government in Europe for the benefit of all.
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/newsroom/cf/itemshortdetail.cfm?item id April
2006.
13European Commission Directorate General Information So-
ciety and Media. ICT for government and public services.
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/activities/egovernment/index en.htm.
9
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pete. It will be prudent for the development of e-government services that
support such services to enable transnational access so that any member state
can compete in the biding process.
The policy direction of high impact key services is to move from closed
national access of certain key services to open transnational access to such ser-
vices across the EU. Certain key services such as job search or, education could
be made available across the EU. General services that facilitate greater citizen
mobility could be made available to other Member States instead of limiting
them to a particular State. This means the e-government has to be designed
and built with large scale cross-border access in mind. Such system should be
able to facilitate free movement, access to medical treatment, benefits and pen-
sions, company registration and VAT refunding for businesses and education
across the EU 10,11. .
2.1.4 Key Enabler
Interoperable ICT systems are systems that can communicate with each other.
Such systems need not to be identical or built on the same platform but should
provide an interface that enable communication. E-government systems are
built on different platforms and in different government department with dif-
ferent design and implementation schemes. For effective e-government such
systems have to work together to meet the demands of the citizens, businesses
as well as the public service or the administration. To prevent repetitive pro-
cesses and duplication of data, effective e-government systems need to work
together or inter operate.
The key enabler is an attempt to ensure effective e-government system
through interoperability. It defines a system that will facilitate Interoperabil-
ity of various e-government systems or subsystems. Such systems should be
able to allow communication between e-government services running in dif-
ferent departments. The system should allow secure transfer of information
or delivery of high impact services from administration to administration, ad-
ministration to businesses and citizens both within and between countries in
the European Union. It should be able to sustain a secured communication
between services, departments, regions and EU countries.
Not only this, but also , access to e-government system needs to be open.
Citizens from one Member State should be able to access high impact services
from another Member State online with little or no constraint. Secure elec-
tronic identity and signature systems will be an important facilitator of this
objective since they enable or boost online transactions. They allow authen-
tication and identification of an individual in online environment to enable
10
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them to access online resources. The action plan proposes electronic identities
for all EU citizens instead of paper identity cards. This will facilitate efficient
and effective identification.
Another key enabler is open source software. Open source software has
source codes available for free. This means that the software can easily be al-
tered to meet the need of a government department. Departments which have
similar needs can share the same system and when the needs change the soft-
ware can be easily altered to meet the new requirements. The cost associated
with open sources is the risk of the responsible owner. Since the code is open
people who use the code are responsible for any demand that may be associ-
ated with the code. On the other hand, government will be able to reduce cost
since open source software are usually free or have less restrictive licenses re-
quirements. However, governments will have to bear the risk associated with
open source software such as maintenance and liability of error. 14 15.
2.1.5 Electronic Participation
The citizens of EU are increasingly becoming less interested in politics. The
election turnout has not being encouraging. The goal of electronic participa-
tion is to find a way of boosting citizen’s interest in politics. To involve or-
dinary people in politics and policy making and making the decision making
processes easier to understand through the use of ICT 12,13
14Commission of the European Communities. i2010 e-government ac-
tion plan, accelerating e-government in Europe for the benefit of all.
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/newsroom/cf/itemshortdetail.cfm?item id April
2006.
15European Commission-Directorate General Information Soci-
ety and Media. ICT for government and public services.
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/activities/egovernment/index en.htm.
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Chapter 3
Data Protection and Privacy
Background
3.1 Overview
Privacy is one of the cornerstones of many democracies, yet difficult to define.
In some democracies the protection of privacy is enshrined in the constitu-
tions, others have general laws that expressly embody privacy protections. In
the US for instance, privacy is regarded as a constitutional right 16. Though
privacy is not explicitly found in US constitution the Bill of Right establishes
constitutional right and privacy may qualify as such 17. European countries in
general apply human right and human dignity approaches to privacy which
may fall outside their respective constitutions.
Privacy depends on the normative values of a state. For instance Lessig 18,
one of the authorities in privacy in the US suggests that personal data should
be regarded as intellectual property that can be traded for profit. This is con-
trary to the Europeans which places emphasis on human dignity. It under-
scores the fundamental normative difference and the level of regard the EU
has for privacy vis-a-vis the US. It also contradicts the normative neutrality
concept expressed by Gavison 19.
16Daniel E Smith. The right to privacy, the rights and liberties under the law page 1.
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/subpages/reviews/glenn404.htm, April 2004
17David Bender and Larry Ponemon. Binding corporate rules for cross border data transfer,
page 124. Rutgers Journal of Law and Urban Policy, 3:2, 2006.
18Lawrence Lessig. Code 2.0, volume 2. Basic Books, 2 edition, December 2006.
19David Bender and Larry Ponemon. Binding corporate rules for cross border data transfer,
page 154. Rutgers Journal of Law and Urban Policy, 3:2, 2006.
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Privacy in US is also sector specific and has no general applicability 20.
This situation in US is partly due to the general mistrust of government led
regulations. Privacy provisions are scattered in many statutes and act. The EU
however, has general law that protect personal data and oversight body that
ensures compliance.
The EU has very stringent rules for privacy and data protection as com-
pared to the US. This high level of regard for data protection in the EU has led
to the issuance of ”a world order” for protection of personal data. DPD article
25(2) 21 requires a third country (countries outside the EU/EEA) to have ade-
quate data protection law in other to allow transfer of personal data from the
EU to that country. This adequacy criterion is imbued in the principle of con-
sent, data integrity, choice, purpose specification, necessity, and data security
and so on.
Notwithstanding, this level of importance attached to personal data and
for that matter privacy has led to a special agreement between the EU and the
US in an apparent attempt by the EU to enforce or impose their law on the
US. This agreement is known as the Safe Harbor agreement. The Safe Harbor
agreement ensures that organizations in the US adhere to the tenets of the EU
data protection laws. The agreement is only between the US and the EU. The
significance of safe harbor is to allow organizations in the US whose operations
require import of personal data from the EU to interact with the EU, so long as
they meet the Safe harbor requirements.
Countries other than the US need to satisfy the high adequacy criteria in
order to import personal data from the EU. So far only few countries such
as Argentina, Switzerland and Canada are able to meet the high adequacy
standard the EU has set.
3.1.1 What is Privacy?
Privacy is a vague word and actually difficult to define. The Black Law dictio-
nary attempts to define privacy as a ”condition or state of being free from public
attention to intrusion into or interference with one’s acts or decisions”. It underlines
two forms of privacy, the autonomy privacy and informational privacy. The
autonomy privacy is the ability of an individual to control his or her personal
activities or intimate personal decisions without outside interference, observa-
tion or intrusion. This means that an individual should be shielded from the
20David Bender and Larry Ponemon. Binding corporate rules for cross border data transfer,
page 154-156. Rutgers Journal of Law and Urban Policy,3:2, 2006.
21Eu data protection directive. http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU Directive .html
October 1995.
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external world but only allow access when it suits her or is required by the
law.
Privacy is also informational according to the Black law dictionary. Infor-
mational privacy is an individual’s right to determine the extent to which in-
formation about oneself is communicated, especially sensitive data such as
health information, political opinions, ethnic origin and so on. Thus informa-
tion privacy is about the management of personal information.
In the 1890s, Louis Brandeis together with Samuel Warren illuminated the
concept of privacy by defining privacy as individual’s ”right to be left alone”
22. Warren and Brandeis also the fathers of privacy in the US, suggested that
privacy was the most cherished of freedoms in a democracy, and advocated
for its inclusion in US Constitution. It was argued however that privacy was
already a constitutional right in the US.
They proposed that privacy is an independent legal norm and is embodied
in the right to be left alone. Privacy does not depend on any other interest
apart from the privacy itself, the right to be left alone.
This meaning of privacy was however challenged by Dean Prosser in the
counter thesis on privacy. In Prosser’s view privacy protects social norms or
interest and is a composition of other values. Privacy is a social interest or
the values the society places on protecting mental tranquility, reputation and
intangible forms of property. Thus privacy is not an independent value as
Warren and Brandeis seems to suggest but dependent on social norms such
as mental tranquility and reputation. Is the right to be left alone the same as
the right to protect one’s reputation? Is the right to be left alone the same as
the right to protect one’s mental tranquility? Is the right to be left alone the
same as the right to protect intangible forms of property? In Prosser’s view
these are separate interest that is not protected by the Warren and Brandeis’s
blanket concept of privacy 23.
What kind of interest is being protected by privacy? Warren and Brandeis
may not be wrong after all as they assumed that the term ”privacy” itself is
complete and adequate to describe any interest being protected or threatened.
Robert Ellis Smith, editor of the Privacy Journal one of authoritative publi-
cation in the world on the individual’s right to privacy, defined privacy as ”the
desire by each of us for physical space where we can be free of interruption, intrusion,
embarrassment, or accountability and the attempt to control the time and manner of
22Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International. Privacy and Human
Right 2002, An International Survey of Privacy Law and Development, volume 1. Butter-
worths, 13 edition, 2002
23Edward J Bloustein Stanley I Benn. Philosophical dimensions of privacy, An Anthology.
Cambridge University Press, 1984
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disclosures of personal information about ourselves.”
Basically, privacy has four main legal dimensions identified by physiologi-
cal, relational, informational and territorial 24 25 26. Physiological privacy con-
cerns the autonomy or the right to protect ones physical self from invasive
procedures such as genetic tests, drug testing and cavity searches. The rela-
tional privacy concerns with the autonomy or the right to the protection of
correspondence such as emails, telephone conversations and so on. Thirdly,
informational privacy is about autonomy or the protection of personal data.
In the EU information privacy is regulated by Data Protection Directive. Fi-
nally, territorial privacy is concerned with the protection from intrusion into
the domestic and other environments such as the work and public space.
3.2 Ambit of Privacy
3.2.1 Overview
The philosophy of privacy discussed above seems to suggest that privacy is
a very imprecise concept with many definitions and unlimited scope. In this
section we examine whether privacy is absolute right or not and if not how
does the legal provisions help to set the limits of privacy. We examine the
article 8 of European Commission on Human Right (ECHR) to understand the
obligations or ambit of the provision.
Like any other right, privacy is not an absolute right and legal provisions
usually safeguard the extent to which the right to privacy can be exercised.
They determine the kind of right protected by privacy and the circumstances
under which such rights could be exercised. These safeguards are not always
explicit in various privacy conventions and statutes. The article 12 of Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and article 17 United
Nation Convention on Human Rights (UNCHR) do not explicitly express the
limit to which the right to privacy could be exercised. Though the main focus
of these conventions is not privacy they have articles on data protection, and
therefore may qualify as privacy conventions. On the other hand article 8 of
ECHR is quite explicit on the extent to which the right to privacy could be ex-
24Ronald Leenes Bert-Jaap Koops. Code and the slow erosion of privacy. 12 Mich.
Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev., 115, 2005
25Council of Europe The European Convention on Human Rights. ROME 4 November 1950
and its Five Protocols, STRASBOURG 20 January 1966. EU, January 1966.
26Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International. Privacy and Human
Right 2002, An International Survey of Privacy Law and Development, volume 1. Butter-
worths, 13 edition, 2002
16
3.2. AMBIT OF PRIVACY
ercised. The ambit of privacy could serve as an adequate tool in our quest to
understand the privacy concept.
The understanding of article 8 of ECHR will better deepen our understand
of right to privacy. In doing so we analyze the essential objects of article 8 27
listed below
• Doctrine of the margin of appreciation
• Private life
• Justifications for interference
• Proportionality
3.2.2 What is the Margin of Appreciation
Another ambit of privacy is the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. It es-
tablishes that privacy is limited by the normative values of member states.
The margin of appreciation refers to the power of a judge in a contracting
state to assess the circumstance surrounding a human right case base on the
normative values of a state in exercising his discretion. The principle of the
margin of appreciation is also the latitude of discretion allowed in a manner in
which standard conventions are implemented, taking into account the norma-
tive values of a state. It follows that the decision of a judge in privacy matters
will be limited by the normative values of the state. The margin of appreciation
does not only set limits on privacy but it helps to safeguard the sovereignty of
a State and also justifies the fact that a national judge is in a better position to
assess the concrete circumstance of a case than an international judge.
The greatest challenge to the margin of appreciation is the potential abuse
of the discretion. Yutaka Arai-Takahashi suggests that the limitation clauses
(article 8(2)) could serve as the remedy to potential abuse of discretionary pow-
ers 28. In relation to privacy, the exercise of discretional powers must be done
27 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. 2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.
28Yutaka Arai-Takahashi. Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportion-
ality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, page 3-10. Intesentia, 2002.
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in accordance with the national law, it must be necessary in a democratic soci-
ety and must pursue one of the legitimate rights of article 8(2) of ECHR. Mar-
gin of appreciation also has the tendency of impacting negatively on setting
common standard for international human right.
Margin of appreciation is developed from case law and not the provisions
of article 8 of ECHR.
3.2.3 What is Private Life
The ECHR article 8 protects individual against ”arbitrary interference by pub-
lic authorities” in his or her private life. What is the right to private life and
where do we place the limit on private life. Does private life extend beyond
the domestic sphere to work place, public places or embrace interpersonal re-
lationship. We examine these in the light of the following cases, Peck v. UK
(2003) and Niemietz v. Germany (1992).
Geoffrey Dennis Peck, is a United Kingdom (UK) national who lived in Es-
sex. On 20 of August 1995 Peck attempted to commit suicide by cutting his
wrist with a knife. He was unaware that he had been filmed by a closed circuit
television (CCTV) camera installed by Brentwood Borough Council. The op-
erators of the CCTV only observed an individual in the possession of a knife
and alerted the police. The police arrived at the scene where they took the
knife and detained Peck under Mental Health Act 1983. He was examined by
a doctor and later released without any charges.
On the 9th of October the footage of the incident was released by the coun-
cil to the public without masking Peck’s face. The footage and the picture of
the incident were published by various media houses some without specifi-
cally masking Peck’s face.
On 23 May 1996 Peck applied to the High Court for leave to apply for ju-
dicial review concerning the Council’s disclosure of the CCTV material. His
request and a further request for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal were
both rejected. The case finally ended up with European Commission of Hu-
man Rights and the complaint was about the disclosure of the CCTV footage
to the media and lack of an effective domestic remedy
The ECtHR held that disclosure of footage to the mass media without ap-
propriate safeguards constitute a disproportionate and unjustified interference
of the applicant’s private life and violates article 8 of the ECHR. What is sig-
nificant in this ruling is the limit of private life according to ECHR article 8.
It seems that private life is not bounded by geographical location. The court’s
focus was on the right to be left alone rather than the location of the incident.
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Private life can be lived in public sphere 29.
Another important case to consider is Niemietz v. Germany. Niemietz was
a lawyer. In 1985 a judge Miosga, a district court judge received an offensive
telefax signed by one K.W and sent by ”AK-BL Freiburg” from the Freiburg
post office. The court instituted criminal proceeding against K.W for insult.
The court ordered investigation into the case. In the course of the investigation
the court issued the search and seizure warrants of any documents found, inter
alia, in the applicant’s office which might aid in revealing the identity of K.W
since the content of the letter was forwarded to the applicant address 30.
The ECtHR commission held that the search constitute violation of private
life and that respect for private life comprised to a certain degree the right to
establish and develop relationships with others. The notion of ”private life”
should not exclude professional or business relationship. The significance of
this ruling is that private life extends beyond home to business premises
3.2.4 What is the Justification for Interference
The exercise of privacy right in the EU is regulated by ECHR article 8(2). It
requires that exercise of privacy right can be limited or interfered with by
law, necessity in democratic society, by the interest of national security, public
safety, or economic well being among others. There should be a careful balance
in how these safeguards are enforced. The thin line between these safeguards
and the privacy protection is crucial in understanding privacy. How should
these safeguards be enforced without infringing individual privacy? This bal-
ance is achieved through the principle of proportionality, reasonability, and
non arbitrariness
3.2.5 Proportionality
Proportionality is a balancing act between computing interest. In balancing the
computing interest, the considerations in favor of a course of action is placed
on one side of a balancing scale and those against are placed on the other side.
Rational people weigh the considerations and come up with a decision that fol-
lows the outcome of the balance. Proportionality in e-government will balance
the interest of data subject against the interest of government in processing the
29ECJ. Judgment in the case between peck v united kingdom.
http://www.echr.coe.int/eng/Press/2003/jan/Peckjudeng.htm, January 2003.
30ECJ. Case of Niemietz vs. Germany. http://www.bagger-tranberg.dk/EU-
ret/Filer homepage/Niemietz vs Germany.pdf, December 1992.
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data.
Proportionality appears a few times in the DPD article 11(2). The use of
proportionality has been inferred from other provision of DPD and other rel-
evant human right conventions. However, it is one of the important princi-
ples in the determination of human right cases in the EU. Proportionality has
become the basic principle of interpretation of the European Convention on
Human Right 31. It one of the principles which is mentioned explicitly in the
Treaty on the European Union Article 5(4).
Most of the core principle of data protection could be determined with the
aid of the proportionality principle. The excessive processing of personal data,
the extent of the personal data processed, the purposes for data processing
could be determined with the proportionality principle. The DPD article 6
could serve as a measure of proportionality.
Applying the proportionality principle requires that the measure is suit-
able and reasonably likely to achieve its objectives. The adverse impact of the
measure is worthy of legal protection and justified in the view of the objective
pursued.
3.3 The Barriers of E-government
The e-signature, e-commerce and data protection directives ( hereafter key en-
abler directives ) are supposed to resolve the legal obstacles to e-government
according to the breaking the barrier to e-government project report 32. For
example, the formal legal requirements of administrative laws such as prefer-
ence for manual signature to electronic signature, could serve as a barrier to
e-government. Such formal legal requirements could be resolved by the im-
plementation of these directives.
Unfortunately, the implementation of these directives have not entirely met
the key enabler requirements anticipated in the i2010 action plan. The imple-
mentation of these directives has produced rather mix results as recognized by
the breaking the barrier to e-government project.
The breaking the barrier to e-government project is the EC sponsored project
which investigated the various obstacles to e-government. The program is in
31Professor J.H.H.Weiler, Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?, Jean Monnet
Working Paper 09/08, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/080901.pdf
32Breaking Barriers to eGovernment, Overcoming obstacles to
improving European public services Modinis study Contract
no. 29172 http://www.egovbarriers.org/downloads/deliverables/1b/
A Legal and Institutional Analysis of Barriers to eGovernment.pdf page 30-33
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response to the requirements of the i2010 action plan. The overall goal of the
project was to identify and explore the barriers to e-government progression in
Europe and suggest organizational, technical and legal solutions to overcome
these obstacles. This will go a long way to ensure the realization of the i2010
action plan key enabler policy objective. One of the objectives of the key en-
abler policy is to ensure that enabling legal framework is in place for successful
implementation of e-government.
The project identified administrative law and traditions as one of the main
legal obstacles to the progress of e-government in the EU. The immediate so-
lution to this barriers is the modernization or adaptation of the administrative
laws of member states to the requirements of technology through the imple-
mentation of the key enabler directives. The report suggested that the im-
plementation of the key enabler directives has not successfully adapted the
administrative laws and traditions of EU member states to meet the require-
ments of e-government. The implementations of these directive has under-
estimated the peculiar needs of administrative law which are necessary for
e-government.
The legal reforms in the ICT field give an indication of modernization of
certain aspect of public administration laws. For instance the e-commerce and
e-signature directives provide the enabling legal framework for e-government
and public administration in areas such as the recognition of electronic sig-
nature and electronic document. The objective clauses of the e-signature di-
rective is to support the use of electronic signatures and to contribute to their
legal recognition, the e-signature directive article 1. The legal equivalence of
electronic signature obstacle is effectively resolved by the electronic signature
directive. Similarly the e-commerce directive ensures legal recognition of elec-
tronic document, the e-commerce directive article 1(2). However the same
cannot be said of the data protection directive.
In my view these legal reforms in the ICT fields both resolved and cre-
ated additional barriers to e-government. The additional barriers created may
not caused by implementation problems of the key enabler directive but the
inherent requirements and objectives of the directives themselves. The data
protection directive especially has a mixed impact on e-government. It seems
to provide legal remedy against unlawful administrative practices rather than
modernization of administrative laws. It could serve as a powerful tool to
check arbitrariness and disproportionate use of power in public administra-
tion. It plays significant role in regulating the balance of power between citizen
and state 33. For instance, administration laws and traditions permit sharing
of information across departments which may be prohibited by the data pro-
33Xavier Huysmans. Privacy-friendly identity management in e-government SpringerLink,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/a34758h15j085420/fulltext.pdf?page=1
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tection directives. Some states even permit the sale of personal information to
the public as in the case of Robertson v City of Wakefield Metropolitan Council
and Another 2001 EWHC Admin 915 LTL 16/11/2001 TLR 27/11/2001 (2002)
2 WLR 889 34. In this case, the Representation of the People Act 2000 (Eng-
land and Wales) mandates the Electoral Registration Officer to disclose the
full electoral register for commercial use upon payment of the appropriate fee.
It was held that the administrative provision is inconsistent with article 8 of
the ECHR and data protection act 1998. The DPD also ensures that data con-
trollers put in place adequate security protection for the protection of personal
data DPD article 17.
The DPD could have significant impact on interoperability which is the
major requirement for the i2010 action plan’s key enabler policy ( see 4.2.4,
2.1.4). Interoperability relies on data sharing but the DPD prohibits unautho-
rized sharing of personal data.
This may calls for the possible review of the DPD in order to implement
the policy. Unfortunately, reviewing the DPD to pave the way for the key en-
abler policy is likely to affect the e-government patronage. Reviewing the DPD
would limit the power of citizens since privacy protection serves as checks on
government. Furthermore, e-government patronage rely heavily on trust 35
therefore high level of privacy is paramount in building the trust in e-government
system.
In effect privacy protection could be regarded as one of the greatest barrier
to e-government.
34http://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/hrarp/summary/index.cfm?iStartRow=300&sSortBy
=dtCaseDate&sOrder=ASC
35Asne Flyen Christine Hafskjold. Security and Privacy, page 2 www.teknologiradet.no,
2007.
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Discussion
4.1 Overview
Technological innovations usually come with their own legal challenges. No
doubt, e-government is not an exception. Privacy, the absence of paper based
documents and signatures, confidentiality and reliability issues will impact
on the successful implementation of e-government system. The solutions to
these challenges often rely on the legal equivalent of the offline regulation for
online environment or in creating sector specific legal regulation to meet the
new demand. Some jurisdictions generally adhere to the principle that, what
applies to offline applies to online. Legal provisions of the offline world can
be applied and upheld in the online environment. This will ensure clarity,
consistency and legal certainty.
The Swiss legal system seems to emphasize this equivalence principle in
their e-government report. The report states, ”The online world is not discon-
nected from the legal one, and many laws adopted long before the creation of the world-
wide web still apply to online transactions. E-government projects must in particular
comply with statutes more specific to the field, such as the general principles of admin-
istrative law and procedure (especially rules of inter-service information exchange),
data and private sphere protection law, administrative transparency law, and, when
applicable, intellectual and industrial property law, contract law and private interna-
tional law” 36
On the other hand, there are very fine details which offline traditional le-
gal rules are incapable of regulating because of certain inherent characteristics
of the online environment and therefore require regulation change in certain
36Corien Prins. e-government, a comparative study of the multiple dimensions of required
regulatory change page 11. Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, 11.3, December 2007
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areas of e-government such as e-voting, e-procurement and privacy etc. E-
voting for instance may require a handwritten signature to be replaced by an
electronic signature. In the EU such new legal requirements of e-government
could be addressed by the existing directives, such as DPD, e-signature di-
rective etc. However, these directives may not be sufficient to meet the re-
quirements of e-government or they may be an obstacle to the growth of e-
government. In the light of these the subsequent sections will analyze the im-
pact of the i2010 action plan on privacy by discussing the research questions
1.2 above.
4.2 What is the Impact of the DPD on the i2010 Ac-
tion Plan
4.2.1 Overview
The data protection directive came into being at a time when e-government
was not prominent as it is today. The DPD basically focuses on individual pri-
vacy and does not consider certain vital requirements of e-government such
as interoperability. As a result the DPD could serve as a barrier to the devel-
opment of e-government. This section discusses how the DPD affects or pro-
motes e-government in the areas such as data security, interoperability among
others.
4.2.2 Does the DPD Apply to E-government
The DPD protects data subjects from privacy abuse by data controller or pro-
cessor. The Directive regulates the activities of data controller. Therefore the
identity of the data controller is paramount in applying the DPD directive.
Where it is impossible to identify the data controller, the DPD directive is likely
to be ineffective. While identification of data controller in a small organization
may seem obvious but the same cannot be said of an institutional superstruc-
ture such as government. Division of labor is not usually as prominent in small
organizations as it is in big ones.
It follows that the question of whether or not the DPD apply to e-government
will depend on the meaning of data controller and whether it is possible to
identify a data controller in e-government. The possibility to identify a data
controller in processing personal data on behave of the government will make
the DPD directive applicable to e-government. The DPD article 2(d) defines
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a data controller as a legal entity or a person who determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data 37. Also any legal person from
whom the personal data originates for transmission from one location to an-
other could be considered as data controller according to the DPD recital 47.
Ultimately, any legal person, agency or authority who determines the pur-
pose and the means of data processing is a data controller. In government
however, such legal person, entity or authority is not always distinct. The
purpose and the means of processing are not always determined by a single
entity. It is possible that the purpose and the means of data processing may
be determined distinctively by different government agencies. The wording
’jointly’ in this provision seems to carry the meaning of collaboration between
two or more entities. It would be impossible for such government agencies to
achieve meaningful results without some form of collaboration. On the other
hand, since the interpretation of the DPD is usually dependent on the overall
objective of a provision rather than the wording, it could be possible to deter-
mine a data controller in this context without placing much emphasis on the
collaboration between the government agencies or departments.
Who has the authority to determine the objective of data processing in
an organization superstructure such as government could also be determined
from characteristics of such organization. Since government is hierarchical in
structure and information flows from top to bottom it would be possible to
find such a public authority or the entity responsible for determining the pur-
pose of data processing. In such organization those lower in the hierarchy act
on behave of those higher in the hierarchy. The wording ’public authority’ in
the DPD article 2(d) seems to suggest that any natural person or entity which
legally act on behave of another could qualify as a data controller. In effect
those entities or legal persons lower in hierarchy would eventually become
the data controllers.
Data controller can also be identified during data transmission or by na-
tional law or regulation. Departments who are responsible for transmission of
data from one location to another may be the data controller. Also national or
Community laws or regulations could be relied upon to determine who is the
data controller as stated in article 2d. Article 2b allows data controller to be
determined by national law or Community law, regulation or specific criteria.
This provision will be very useful in e-government where policies are usually
backed by law or regulations.
37controller shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other
body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing
of personal data; where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or
Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination may
be designated by national or Community law
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We can therefore conclude that the DPD apply to e-government.
4.2.3 Does the DPD Prohibit Intelligent Use of Data?
Normalization is a technical means of removing data redundancy from databases.
Normalization helps to avoid storing the same data in more than one database
tables in order to prevent update anomalies. Most online information systems
have databases support. Databases consist of tables which store the actual
information. The tables in the database have to be designed to remove redun-
dant information in order to save storage space and also make the database
more effective in terms of time spent in retrieving information 38.
To achieve this aim, data from different department can be combined using
so called primary and foreign keys. A primary key is a unique key or data that
identifies a record or a set of data. The foreign key serves as a link that connect
a unique primary key such as personal number or social security number to
redundant or dynamic data such as login time in order to reduce redundancy
and to prevent update anomalies. In normalization, we start with logically
inconsistent table. The table is then split into two and primary and foreign
keys are assigned to them. The primary key is attached to the static data table
and the foreign keys are attached to the dynamic data table. The primary and
the foreign keys are used to create a relationship between these two tables in
the database. When this setup is complete the unique primary key can be used
in several database tables without the need to repeat the name and address the
primary key links to. This means by referencing the primary key the name and
address can be known and dynamic or redundant data about an entry in the
redundant information table can be known.
The following example will illustrates how normalization works. Univer-
sity of Oslo has student web which allows students to register for a semester
course, check results among other things. The home page displays data, which
consists of items such as department, semester fee paid completed semester
registration, semester receipt sent, study programme, class, status and right to
study. It also consists of student name, address, the name of the university etc.
These items are called fields in database. Suppose the department field stores
the department name and changes each time a student register for a course in
a particular department. The Semester fee paid field stores data about when a
student pays his or her fees and changes whenever a new payment is due. We
can observe that some of the fields are dynamic or redundant and others are
more or less static. The dynamic fields are those that change regularly such as
Semester fee paid field etc. The student name, the study programme and the
38http://databases.about.com/od/specificproducts/a/normalization.htm
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university name are static fields since they barely change. The initial database
table for university of Oslo studentweb may have the following entries in table
4.1.
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Table 4.1: Unnormalized entry
name school Study Class Status Right dept fee paid registration course
John Haakon Uio ICT Law 2008 autumn Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2008 ICTLaw 2008 2008 privacy
John Haakon Uio ICT Law 2008 autumn Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2009 ICTLaw 2009 2009 thesis
Andy Morrison Uio ICT Law 2008 autumn Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2008 ICTLaw 2008 2008 privacy
Andy Morrison Uio ICT Law 2008 autumn Inactive Plan confirmed 1.12.2008 ICTLaw 2008 2008 nothing
Table 4.1 has two students each of them registered twice with University
of Oslo. Each time they register, their student names, the study programme
and the university name have to be repeated if the data is not organized intel-
ligently. To ensure intelligent organization of the data, the database table 4.1
need to be (normalized) split into two tables consisting of static and dynamic
tables. Since the student name, the study programme and the university name
are static fields it will be unnecessary and redundant to request for them each
time a student want to register for a course. It will also create update prob-
lem since modifying the ’Class’ field for example will affect only one record
instead of two creating inconsistent data. So normalization will be used to sep-
arate the dynamic data from the static ones. This is done by assigning unique
keys (primary keys) to the statics data. The primary keys are then duplicated
in the dynamic database table. The duplicated primary keys in the dynamic
database table are called foreign keys. This way only the keys which reference
the static data are repeated but the data themselves remain in the static table.
The repetition of the keys will save more storage space than the repetition of
the entire static data. This is because we use only one field (foreign key) to
represent several fields. It will also allow the data controller or data subject to
perform further processing with the aid of a key instead of typing or supplying
the same personal data again and again.
The normalized tables will now look as follows:
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Table 4.2: Static fields
primary key name school Study Class
101 John Haakon University of Oslo ICT Law 2008 autumn
102 Andy Morrison University of Oslo ICT Law 2008 autumn
Table 4.3: Dynamic fields
foreign key Status Right dept fee paid registration course
101 Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2008 ICTLaw 2008 2008 privacy
101 Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2009 ICTLaw 2009 2009 thesis
102 Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2008 ICTLaw 2008 2008 privacy
102 Inactive Plan confirmed 1.12.2008 ICTLaw 2008 2008 nothing
The tables 4.2 and 4.3 represent the separation of table 4.1 into static and
dynamic parts. The table 4.2 consists of all fields that will not change regularly
and 4.3 consists of all fields that will change regularly. The data in the 4.2 is
usually supplied once. Table 4.2 is connected to 4.3 with the aid of primary
and foreign keys. This means anytime the foreign keys 101 or 102 is repeated
in the 4.3, the database will automatically know that 101 and 102 refer to the
static data of John Haakon and Andy Morrison respectively (in table 4.2). With
this data organization the number 101 will be used to represent John Haakon’s
static data in the subsequence data processing.
This could be extend further so that different departments could use the
same 101 to access data about John Haakon. Suppose John Haakon want to
register for a course in another department, he or the data controller has to
add a new entry to table 4.3 and change the entries for the ’dept’ and the
’course’ fields to the new entries as depicted in the able 4.4 below.
Table 4.4: Dynamic fields
foreign key Status Right dept fee paid registration course
101 Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2008 ICTLaw 2008 2008 privacy
101 Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2009 ICTLaw 2009 2009 thesis
101 Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2009 HRLaw 2009 2009 HR001
102 Active Plan confirmed 13.06.2008 ICTLaw 2008 2008 privacy
102 Inactive Plan confirmed 1.12.2008 ICTLaw 2008 2008 nothing
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The table 4.4 makes it easy for John Haakon to register for a course in the
human right department (HR) without filling a new registration form. All that
he has to do is to add a course and change the department name. Instead of
starting the whole registration process again in the human right department
the ICTLaw department and human right department can easily share data
through normalization. Both the human right department and the ICTLaw
department will require access to a common database to make this intelligent
use of data possible. Better still the departments can be assigned primary and
foreign keys in a similar manner as discussed above in order to eliminate the
dependance of department on the database organization. This will lead to
what is known as third normal form. The levels of consistency designed into
a database organization is identify by its normal form. The higher the normal
form the less vulnerable it is to inconsistencies and anomalies 39.
If John Haakon’s address changes he only has to do it in the static table
and it will automatically reflect in other departments because the primary key
remains the same.
Thus, instead of allowing each department or unit to keep separate ad-
dresses for each data subject, normalization can be used to prevent the redun-
dancy so that the units or the departments can use only one address for their
various operations. This helps to ensure data consistency as an address change
at one department will automatically reflect in the other departments.
Normalization will help government to spend less time in organizing data
when a new department is created from the existing ones or departments are
reorganized. There may be no need to merge personal data obtained from the
separate departments in order for the a new department to function, because
organization of personal data is no longer dependent on departments as a re-
sult of normalization.
This is a typical example of intelligent use of data. However, this way of
organizing data may be prohibited by the DPD. It may be against the principle
of purpose specification . Normalization will allow different departments to
access the same data collected for a specific purpose. Since different govern-
ment departments may have unrelated objectives, such processing may run
contrary to the original purpose for which the data was collected. It may there-
fore not be consistent with the DPD recital 28 and article 6(b) which prohibit
re-purposing of data.
Intelligent use of data could facilitate the quality of data in accordance with
DPD article 6(d) . Instead of having personal data scattered across government
departments, normalization can provide a single data source which can ensure
39http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Database normalization#Normal forms
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consistency and accuracy of data. Normalization can ensure that data change
at one government department reflect in all departments. The DPD article 6(b)
could be an obstacle to intelligent use of data.
This obstacle could be remove if data subject concern is sought during reg-
istration process to allow data sharing. This will be consistent with DPD recital
30 and article 7.
4.2.4 Interoperability
Interoperability comes from two words ”inter” and ”operability”. In the com-
puting world it is the ability of two or more incompatible systems to work
together. For example the Microsoft operating system should be able to com-
municate with the Linux operating system. For non computing fields it is the
ability of two or more departments, organizations, regions or governments to
work together. Interoperability is the ability of two or more organizations to
communicate and share information, such as voice, data, images and video
40. In the i2010 action plan, interoperability is beyond the ”interoperation” be-
tween departments and organization within a state but embraces cross-border
services for citizens, businesses and public administrations. This means var-
ious organs of state and member states should be able to share information
such as personal data. Interoperability could ensure secure communications
between administrations or cross-border access to resources 41.
To achieve interoperability requires technical schemes which will ensure
that personal data can be accessed or shared among departments, organiza-
tions and States. There are various schemes available for these possibilities.
Among them are, using centralized databases or information system, elec-
tronic identification management (eIDM) system and distributed databases or
information system. These schemes are referred to as key enablers (see 2.1.4 ).
Database helps to ensure proper storage space management and data retrieval
in an information system.
The design schemes for databases determine how data is organized in an
information system. For centralization, the database is stored in one location
for all authorized users. This means the same database could be shared by dif-
40 Office Of Domestic Preparedness, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/acu trp1000.pdf.
Developing Multi-Agency Interoperability Communications Systems, User’s Handbook page
8
41Commission of the European Communities. i2010 e-government ac-
tion plan, accelerating e-government in Europe for the benefit of all.
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/newsroom/cf/itemshortdetail.cfm?item id April
2006.
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ferent government departments, administrations or governments. An exam-
ple of an information system that supports centralized database is Schengen
Information System (SIS). This is the Schengen states surveillance information
system which is used for cross-border surveillance. Information stored in the
SIS central database can be accessed by all member states. When information
such as wanted or unwanted persons is stored in SIS central database from a
state, all the member states will be able to access the information and act ac-
cordingly. Other information systems that support centralized databases are
Europol, Interpol etc.
Distributed databases or information systems are quite different from the
centralized system. Unlike centralization where only one database is kept for
universal access, distributed information system mostly requires each depart-
ment, agency or state to keep a separate database. The information in this
separate database is now shared with the aid of middleware software. Middle-
ware is software that allows different computer programs running on different
computers to communicate. The main advantage of distributed system over
centralized system is that it provides multiple sources of failure and security.
This means when one computer is not working the other computer could be
relied on for data access. On the other hand, since only one computer is usu-
ally used in centralized system, when that computer breaks down or is hacked
the entire information system could collapse.
The drawbacks of the distributed system is data consistency. Since there
are several computers involved in the distributed system there is the need for
consented effort to ensure that information is up to date on all the computers.
The need for interoperability raises privacy concerns in areas such as in-
formation quality, information transfer, proportionality, the use of eIDM, re-
purpose of data and data subject’s control issues. Data controllers need to
ensure that the information they collect are complete and of high quality.
The data collected should be meaningful with respect to what they are
intended to describe, relevant and complete with respect to the purpose for
which the data was collected 42. The DPD article 6(1)d requires that data col-
lected from data subjects should be accurate and kept up to date. This pro-
vision could have significant impact on the interoperability requirements of
i2010 action plan. This means whatever information system scheme is used
in implementing interoperability must ensure that personal data is kept up to
date. The easiest way to achieve interoperability and yet keep data up to date
is to use a centralized database or information system. This way, only a copy
of a person’s data will be maintained in the information system. Any change
42Lee A Bygrave. Data Protection Law Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits, page
62-69. Kluwer Law International, 2002
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made to the personal data will occur at one point. This will ensure quality and
consistent information. On the other hand, decentralized or distributed sys-
tem could have an impact on data consistency. According to DPD article 7(a)
the data subject could decide which member state is allowed to process his
or her personal data. He could also withdraw the consent when appropriate.
When this happens the personal data has to be updated in all the distributed
information system. This could be a daunting task and could lead to data
inconsistency. In distributed system, communication error could potentially
contribute to data inconsistency. If a network error occurs in a part of the in-
formation system during transmission part of the information system could be
updated while the rest remains outdated.
The design choices of the information system could impact on information
quality or data consistency. For example the SIS allows contracting states to
keep their own national database which will be out of synch with the cen-
tralized SIS database. The information about cross-border security obtained
nationally is sent to the central SIS database from time to time. A copy of
the information is kept in the national database. When an error occurs dur-
ing transmission or during information update the information in the national
information system will be inconsistent with the central information system.
In 43 it was noted that the same search query has to be sent to both the na-
tional database and the SIS database because a national search is not only a SIS
search, but it involves a search in both the national system and SIS database.
Persons not registered in SIS would escape detection because a negative hit in
SIS does not necessarily mean that a person is cleared. Searching the national
information system or database may reveal other information than the one in
the SIS, since a person may be registered in the national system but not in SIS.
This means the two databases are not always consistent with each other.
This underscores the potential of data quality problems with such infor-
mation system and how design choices could have an impact on the privacy
of data . Incomplete or inconsistent personal data is a violation of the DPD
article 6(1)d. E-government systems which are designed to be accessed across
member states could potentially suffer from information quality problems.
Purpose specification is another potential danger to privacy in interoper-
able e-government system. Personal data has to be collected for a specific
purpose and personal data collected for one purpose cannot be processed for
other incompatible purpose without the consent of the data subject. The pur-
pose shall be defined, shall be legitimate and further processing of the data
collected shall be compatible the DPD recital 28, article 6(1)b.
43Stephen Kabera Karanja. The Schengen information system in Austria, an essential tool
in day to day police and border control work. Journal of Information, Law and Technology
(JILT), 2002
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Data sharing could change the original purpose for which data is collected.
Normalized databases link a unique key such as a personal number to per-
sonal data such as name and street address. Once this is done, different de-
partments and government agencies can use the personal number to access the
information without the need to fill a new form since the database is normal-
ized or centralized across the departments or states. Since each department
usually has different missions, the retrieval of personal data from a central-
ized database for use in different departments could lead to re-purposing of
data. For instance, information given for tax purposes could also be used for
population or election purpose. Thus information given at one government
department for a specific purpose could be used for many purposes. This is
usually known as proactive services 44. In Ireland for instance the birth of a
second child automatically allows information to be sent to the responsible
agency which will trigger child allowance without the parent filling any addi-
tional form.
It is convenient not to fill a new form each time you visit a different gov-
ernment department but the practice may violate the DPD article 6(1)(b), 10(b),
and 11(b) . Some of these possible violations may be caused by technical de-
sign choices and the need for convenience. It is technically convenient, effec-
tive and efficient to design such information systems. It however important
to note that such data processing may not always lead to the violation of the
DPD if it is done fairly and consistent with the original purpose.
The action plan is expected to support cross-border identification (see 2.1.4).
This will lead to the development of an eIDM system. The electronic iden-
tification system will allow authentication, enabling convenient and secure
access to different applications and computer resources across the EU. Un-
der the eIDM system users can use a single login to access e-government re-
sources across the EU. This means either the personal data would be stored
in a centralized or distributed information system for processing by member
states. In 2003 The Working Party of Data Protection in examining the secu-
rity risk of Microsoft.NET Passport found that the concentration of data in
two big databases posed a serious security risk 45. This suggests that using
distributed database system for eIDM system could help minimize the secu-
rity risk. However, when personal data is distributed across-borders it will
be difficult to ensure proper data subject control as required by directive DPD
article 11(c), 12(a). In order for data subjects to be properly assured of infor-
mation quality they need to acquire the information from all the possible data
44Thomas B Riley. E-government vs. e-governance, examining the differences in a changing
public sector climate. May 2003 page 159-163
45EU Data Protection Working Party. Working document on online authentication services.
Technical Report 10054/03/EN WP 68, EU, January 2003 page 11
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controllers across the member states. This will put undue burden on the data
subject and may not be proportionate.
Interoperability is not always a danger if the necessary conditions exist for
such processing. The DPD article 7(b), 7(c) , 7(d) and recital 30, allows such
forms of processing if they are necessary. It is however not clear whether this
form of data processing that will help government departments and state op-
erations is necessary. This will depend on the interpretation of ’necessary’. In
a very strict sense such government operation may not be necessary. Even if
the ’necessary’ requirement is less stringent, it is not clear if the validity of
processing will be proportionate to the original goal of data collection.
4.2.5 Data Security
The risk to data security is increased the moment personal data is put on a
network or a form is made available online to collect personal data. The risk
is even greater when the network is connected to the Internet. On the Internet,
the potential risk of unauthorized access is global. Anyone who has access to
the Internet could illegally access personal data if appropriate security mea-
sures are not put in place.
The security of personal data stored online will require a proper password
scheme to allow future retrieval of the information online. It will require en-
cryption to protect the data during transmission from the data subject to the
data controller. Spam is one of the security threats to privacy. Spam is unso-
licited e-mail sent from anonymous individual or businesses to a person usu-
ally for marketing purposes, without the consent of the person. Spam can also
be used for a denial of service (DOS) attack, or e-mail borne attack on an ISP
or an enterprise e-mail system. For this purpose bulk e-mail is sent to the e-
mail server of an ISP in attempt to slow or shut the server down all together.
The basic spam input is the e-mail address transmitted over the Internet. The
spammers collect the e-mail addresses during data transmission online and
use them to spam their victims. Though the e-mail address could be revealed
from many sources online, e-government cannot be an exception. It was found
in 46, that between 1 July and December 2005 spam made up 50% of all mon-
itored e-mail traffic with annual average of 68.6%. The EC’s Technical report
noted that the number of e-mail-borne attacks on businesses have increased
from an insignificant figure to 2-3 targeted attacks per week during 2005.
The relevant of spam to privacy may depend on whether it is likely to iden-
46European Commission Information Society and Media Directorate General. Statisti-
cal data on network security, page 3-8. Technical report, Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brux-
elles/Wetstraat 200, B-1049 Brussel - Belgium - Office: BU29 03/41, march 2007
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tify an individual with his or her e-mail. Since spammers spam with e-mail
without authorization such use may violate the provisions of the data pro-
tection directive if e-mails are regarded as personal data. Whether or not an
e-mail is a personal data will depends on the interpretation of personal data.
According to the DPD article 2a, personal data is any information relating to a
data subject. The data should directly or indirectly relate to the natural person
or to his identification number, physical, physiological, mental, economic, cul-
tural or social identity. The extent of such a relationship shall be understood
as a less stringent one, the DPD recital 26. The slightest possible relationship
between data and data subject may make the data personal. There should be
a reasonable way in establishing this relation. Cost, time and energy spent in
relating data to a natural person or a natural person to data either directly or
indirectly determines the degree of reasonability. Information per se has no
relevance if it has no likely reasonably means of relating to a data subject (an
identified individual).
This means an auxiliary information such as e-mail may qualify as personal
data if the auxiliary data relates to an individual. It is possible to indirectly
relate e-mail to an individual if there is readily available automated databank
or additional data. If there is no readily available directory for lookup or any
such means, e-mails may be irrelevant for identification since it will not relate
to any identified individual. Also e-mails usually contain names of individuals
which could make it easy to relate it to an individual.
Phishing is also another important area of network security. Phishing is
a means of acquiring sensitive information such as user name, password or
credit card information, by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an elec-
tronic communication 47. Unsuspecting users can be redirected to a fake equiv-
alent of original site through phishing. When the password and user name
is obtain through phising they could be used to obtain additional informa-
tion which could be personal. For instance an the password and user name to
someone’s e-mail account is obtained through phising it can be used to know
the phone number, address, data of birth and other personal data since they
are usually accessible from the in box. According to the EU security report,
phishing continues to be a great security threat. It accounts for 1 in every 304
of all email transactions since 2005, about 200% rise of the 2004 figure.
Another security risk to e-government is malware attacks. Malware can
expose confidential information on a compromised computer. Malware can
damage computer without the owner of the computer being aware. In 2004
nearly 80% of home personal computer (PC) were infected by malware and
2.8% of scanned emails in 2005 contained malware. Cyber attacks are rising
47Wikipedia. Phishing. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phising
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over 20% per annum.
On the impact of intrusion, the report noted that 68% of organizations has
experienced at least one intrusion in 2004 and 88% anticipate an increase in
intrusion during 2005.
On the surface the provisions of DPD article 17 is reassuring since it will
burden the data controllers with the obligation to make adequate security pro-
vision for personal data. The DPD article 17 ensures that the data controller
protects personal data from the risk of transmission in cyberspace. However,
what is not clear is what level of security is adequate? There is no specific se-
curity standard or practice specified in the provision. Considering the level of
sophistication of the cyberspace attack adequate security will only encourage
ad hoc security measures which are usually not up to the task. A standard
security measure will ensure proper security and promote transparency. The
data subject will know what is in place for security. This will go a long way to
minimize the security fears data subject have for e-government. Network se-
curity and privacy concerns were significant in the low e-government patron-
age. 30-40% of users surveyed cited network security and privacy concerns as
the cause of the low patronage in the i2010 midterm review report 48. There
are security standards and best practices such as International Organization
for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission ( ISO/IEC )
27033, the Guide to the Assessment of IT risk (GAIT), enhanced Telecom Oper-
ations Map (eTom) and Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL)
which provide specific security guidelines capable of withstanding the sophis-
tication of cyberspace attack.
Online security has three main components:
• the security at the data subject’s end,
• the security at the data controller’s and
• security between the two ends.
Each of these three areas needs adequate protection to ensure the security
of personal data. The e-government policy is likely to increase the number of
citizens who will own and run their own PC online. Since many users lack
adequate protection on their home PCs according to European Commission
48Statistical Data On Network Security, page 3-8, European Commission Information Soci-
ety and Media Directorate-General, 2007, Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Bruxelles/Wetstraat 200, B-
1049 Brussel- Belgium - Office: BU29 03/41, ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/ist/docs/trust-
security/statistics-network-security-050307 en.pdf
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Information Society and Media Directorate report, 49, it is not clear if it is pro-
portionate for data subjects, to be subjected to the requirement of owing and
making their home PCs available online without the skills necessary to protect
them. The all inclusive policy (see 2.1.1), is likely to put about 30% of EU cit-
izen or data subject at risk of online attack if they are not provided with the
necessary skills.
Vulnerable citizens do not only need security from the data controller or
processor end or between the transmission lines where data travels but also
at the data subject’s end. Therefore some of the requirements of the eInclu-
sive would not be proportionate if government does not take an active part to
ensuring that vulnerable users acquire the adequate skills needed to protect
them from intrusion. The ”no citizen left behind” policy recognizes the need
for ICT skill. The policy notes that ICT skills is the core for it successful im-
plementation. The policy will ensure that those with no ICT skill acquire the
necessary skill. This may include network security and all the basic security
knowhow necessary to maintain a home PC online. If this policy is imple-
mented effectively, it will help ensure effective privacy protection when using
e-government services. ICT skills are recognized as one of the 52 benchmark
indicators in RAND’s report (see 50). This goes to confirm how important ICT
skills is to the i2010 action plan.
One of the greatest security threats which is often overlooked is the internal
security. With today’s level of sophistication a small memory stick could be
used to carry unprecedented amount of data which could be detrimental to
data subjects and the organization. Employees could reveal, steal or access
personal data without proper authorization. In the case of R v Rooney 2006
EWCA crim 1841, Rooney was convicted for disclosing the name of the town
R was leaving to her sister. Rooney was an employee of a human resources
department of a police constabulary, where she had access to the personal data
of other employees. The prosecution argued that the defendant had abused
her position and breached the Data Protection Act 1998 (”DPA”) by accessing
personal information that was not related to her work and then passing it on
to someone without consent 51.
49European Commission Information Society and Media Directorate- General. Statisti-
cal data on network security, page 3-8. Technical report, Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Brux-
elles/Wetstraat 200, B-1049 Brussel - Belgium - Office: BU29 03/41, march 2007
50Irma Graafland-Essers and Emile Ettedgui. Benchmarking e-government in Europe and
the US, page 10. RAND, 2003
51R v Rooney. CASETRACK, http://www.casetrack.com/ct4plc.nsf/items/6-203-6631,
2006.
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4.3 Does the i2010 Plan Shows Strong Privacy Con-
cerns?
The i2010 action plan does not explicitly emphasize on privacy. However, in
the ”no citizen left behind” policy, the phrases ”...citizens benefit from trusted,
innovative services.. . ” and ”... eIDM ... complying with data protection regula-
tions” used to describe the nature of services to be provided and the nature of
the electronic identification management (eIDM) system. In report found in 52,
which is an extensive exposition of the i2010 policy, does not raise any privacy
concerns. It rather focuses on the issue of identification and authentication in
the key enabler policy section. Privacy is not given much prominence. Fur-
thermore, the issue of ”trust” was not expanded in the section 2 of the action
plan.
Moreover, making ”efficient and effective public services delivery a real-
ity” policy objective of the i2010 action plan does not make mention of privacy.
This policy objective requires benchmarks on how the efficiency and effective-
ness of e-government system can be measured. Various indicators has been
developed as a results of this policy objective, however, among the 52 bench-
mark indicator there is no attempt to quantify privacy 53. There is no mention
of privacy impact assessment in fulfillment of the accountable e-government
policy objective expressed in this section. The requirement for effectiveness
in that policy objective includes high user satisfaction, transparency and ac-
countability.
The brief use of ”trusted” in the ”...trusted innovative services” in the pol-
icy objective of the action plan seems to indicate the significance of privacy and
security concerns. Though the recognition of trust in this document is an im-
portant step in ensuring properly functioning and accountable e-government
information system it does not go far enough to illuminate their significance.
Trusted e-government systems are an essential ingredient in boosting citizens’
confidence and therefore it cannot be taken lightly.
Ironically, comparing this action plan to that of US, the US has a clear and
vivid policy on privacy. In the e-government Act Section 208 Implementa-
tion Guidance of US, privacy is explicitly expressed as one of the prominent
requirement for e-government system. There is a clear privacy policy and re-
quirements. These include privacy impact assessment policy objective, post
52European Commission-Directorate General Information Soci-
ety and Media. ICT for government and public services.
http://ec.europa.eu/information society/activities/egovernment/index en.htm.
53Commission of the European Communities. Preparing Europes digital future i2010 Mid-
Term Review, volume 3 of COM(2008) 199 final. EC, April 2008.
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privacy assessment policy objective and privacy translation policy objective
54.
This disparity could be attributed to the value the US places on privacy in
case of e-government. Or the fact that privacy is sector specific and requires
more detailed policy than that of the EU which relies on comprehensive laws
or directives. Also the disparity in the level of trust US and EU citizens have
for their respective governments could influence the rather strong privacy con-
cerns by the US government. US citizens usually dislike government backed
regulations so the assurance of trust is necessary to ensure successful imple-
mentation of e-government system.
In addition, the disparity could also be informed by the main goal of the
policy plans. Though the i2010 action plan somehow expresses privacy and se-
curity, it seems to place more emphasis on the economic benefit of e-government
than trusted e-government system. The lack of strong privacy concern could
also be attributed to the general disregard for privacy in European e-government
system as noted by Xavier Huysmans 55.
It could also be attributed to the fact that the EU has working party es-
tablished by DPD article 29 to oversee the impact of technological advance-
ment such as e-government on privacy. Over the years the working party has
taken up the responsibility of investigating various privacy infringements in-
stigated by technological innovation. The most relevant to this thesis is the
Microsoft.NET passport investigation 56. A number of recommendations were
made in this report which could help shape the privacy policy regarding the
use of eIDM in e-government systems across the EU.
4.4 The Need for Privacy Impact Assessment
The need for privacy impact assessment will depend on the value of privacy to
e-government system. The success of e-government may be linked to how pri-
vacy fears are alleviated. Privacy is one of the factors that affect the patronage
of e-government. In 2003, a report published by RAND Europe partly dwelled
on the importance and impact of privacy on e-government. According to the
report, e-government services which require users to reveal less personal in-
formation enjoyed greater patronage than those which require great deal of
54Office Of Management and Budget. e-government act section 208 implementation guid-
ance. http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda m03-22/, Feb 2006
55Xavier Huysmans. Privacy-friendly identity management in e-government. SpringerLink,
http://www.springerlink.com/content/a34758h15j085420/fulltext.pdf?page=1
56EU Data Protection Working Party. Working document on online authentication services.
Technical Report 10054/03/EN WP 68, EU, January 2003
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personal information57. Five years down the line there has not been much
significant change in the e-government patronage across the EU. Many of the
factors that affect e-government patronage seem unaddressed.
The midterm e-government country review report released in April 2008
depicts low e-government patronage 58. The report presented the results of 52
e-government benchmark indicators which were set up by the Commission in
co-operation with Member States. This is in accordance with the i2010 bench-
mark framework endorsed by the i2010 High Level Group in April 2006. The
country profile report shows general rise in the availability of e-government
services but a stagnant process in the patronage of these services. Austria is
one of the high performing countries in this report with 100% basic public ser-
vices fully available online. Unfortunately the patronage of these services saw
a sharp decline from 33% to 27% between 2006 and 2007. Comparing the 2007
figure to the population of Internet users, more than 50% of the citizens do not
use e-government services. Belgium has 63% Internet users but as at 2007 only
23% of the Internet users were e-government service users.
Norway was ranked as one of the top performing States. 26% of Norwe-
gians used e-government services to send filled in forms. This is twice the Eu-
ropean average. 57% out of 77% of regular Internet users used e-government
services. It recorded 5% rise of users between 2006 and 2007.
In general an average of 13% used e-government services to send filled in
forms and not more 35% of Internet users in the Member States patronized
e-government services according to the report.
There are many factors such as privacy, security, trust that could contribute
to this slow pace of patronage as outlined in the RAND report 59. . Trust
may composition of privacy and security concerns . Lack of security and
privacy could have negative impact on the e-government patronage. Conve-
nience on the other hand could impact positively on e-government patronage.
Convenience usually overrides the need for privacy and is likely to increase e-
government patronage. According to the RAND Europe report, ”The attitudes
of citizens toward e-government point to convenience of time and location as factors
that strongly favor e-government over traditional government”.
Although the reasons for this low patronage was not cited in the i2010 mid-
term country review report the impact of privacy and other factors such as
57Irma Graafland-Essers and Emile Ettedgui. Benchmarking e-government in Europe and
the US, page 10. RAND, 2003
58Commission of the European Communities. Preparing Europes digital future i2010 Mid-
Term Review, volume 3 of COM(2008) 199 final. EC, April 2008
59Irma Graafland-Essers and Emile Ettedgui. Benchmarking e-government in Europe and
the US, page 10. RAND, 2003
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convenience on the patronage of e-government services cannot be underesti-
mated. In 60 the report revealed that there seem to be decreasing use of e-
government services. Network security and privacy concerns were significant
in the low patronage. 30-40% of users surveyed cited network security and pri-
vacy concerns as the cause of the low patronage. It is therefore quite uncertain
why privacy impact assessment was not recognized as part of the 52 perfor-
mance indicators. The impact of privacy on the patronage of e-government
services requires proper consideration since it has the potential of improving
the patronage.
60Statistical Data On Network Security, page 3-8, European Commission Information Soci-
ety and Media Directorate-General, 2007, Rue de la Loi 200, B-1049 Bruxelles/Wetstraat 200, B-
1049 Brussel- Belgium - Office: BU29 03/41, ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/ist/docs/trust-
security/statistics-network-security-050307 en.pdf
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Conclusion
E-government has come to stay and future public administration cannot do
without it. There is no doubt that privacy will play a significant role in ensur-
ing proportionality and in regulating the power balance between citizens and
states. To a large extent privacy will contribute to the level of e-government
patronage and eventual success of the i2010 program. For that matter strong
privacy concern is required to alleviate all fears regarding misuse of personal
data. For this to be fulfilled, there should be explicitly policy guidelines on
how privacy issues should be handled in e-government. This will reassure the
participants of the e-government system. It is observed that the policy does
not show strong privacy concerns. The approach to privacy in the i2010 ac-
tion plan could not ensure proper balance of power between individuals and
states. There are no clear policy guidelines as to how privacy and data protec-
tion should be implemented in e-government system. Lack of privacy impact
assessment for the plan gives an indication of less regards for privacy in the
plan. It is observed that the US plan has comprehensive privacy plan for e-
government and that could reassuring data subject and boost e-government
patronage.
The DPD will go a long way to reassure data subjects of protection against
online security risk. It put the responsibility on the data controller to ensure
that proper security provisions are made to protect personal data. However
the adequacy security requirement is not transparent enough to alleviate pri-
vacy fears. By adopting standard security practices or standards would help
minimize privacy fears and fulfill the objectives of adequate security. It is also
significant to note that DPD article 17 does not cover or protect data subject’s
home PC. Since home PCs suffer greatly from security threats it is important
for government to support programs that will aid vulnerable data subject who
otherwise would not rely on home PC to engage.
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government online. This will be proportionate and will help to reassure the
data subject of total security and also enhance patronage. The issue of infor-
mational quality could be solved with robust information system capable of
with stand network or communication error. Such system should not collapse
when communication error occur but be able to continue trying the update
process until it is successful. In case online live update is not possible, there
should be effective way of doing offline update in order to ensure information
quality.
Finally, data protection provision will be greatest obstacles to interoperabil-
ity in the e-government action plan. In many respect interoperability require-
ment could violate some of the provisions of DPD. Interoperability is a key to
the i2010 action plan policy objectives. Provisions such as data subject control,
re-purposing of data, fairness and identification could impact on how interop-
erability is achieved in e-government. This means the design choices need to
consider the effect of these obstacles in order to meet the requirements of DPD.
We observed that this could be achieved at the expense of technical efficiency
and effectiveness, and data subject convenience. For this to be avoided there is
a need to revise certain aspect of the Directive that is inimical to achieving the
all important goal of interoperability. There must be a careful balance in order
not to dispossess the data subject of the right to privacy.
Also a comprehensive e-government legislation that seeks to address the
privacy barrier to e-government may be necessary to the meet the important
requirements of i2010 action plan. This will be consistent with the examples set
by Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia and, recently,
France 61. In doing so, we need to ensure a careful balance between strong
privacy protection and the need to meet the requirements of the i2010 action
plan in order not to erode public trust in e-government.
61Breaking Barriers to eGovernment, Overcoming obstacles to
improving European public services Modinis study Contract
no. 29172 http://www.egovbarriers.org/downloads/deliverables/1b/
A Legal and Institutional Analysis of Barriers to eGovernment.pdf page 32
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